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Abstract: Tree-like visualizations have played a central role in 
taxonomic and evolutionary biology for centuries, and the idea of a 
“tree of life” has been a pervasive notion not only in biology but 
also in religion, philosophy, and literature for much longer. The 
tree of life is a central figure in Darwin’s Origin of Species in both 
verbal and visual forms. As one of the most powerful and pervasive 
images in biological thought, what conceptual and communicative 
work has it enabled? How have the visual qualities and elements of 
the tree form interacted with biological thinking over time? This 
paper examines the pre-Darwinian history of tree images, the 
significance of Darwin’s use of such images, and the development 
of tree diagrams after Darwin. This history shows evidence of four 
separate traditions of visualization: cosmological, logical-
philosophical, genealogical, and materialist. Visual traditions serve 
as rhetorical contexts that provide enthymematic backing, or what 
Perelman calls “objects of agreement,” for interpretation of tree 
diagrams. They produce polysemic warrants for arguments in 
different fields. The combination of the genealogical tradition with 
the cosmological and the logical changed the framework for 
thinking about the natural world and made Darwin’s theory of 
evolution possible; the later materialist tradition represents the 
“modernization” of biology as a science.  
 
Keywords: evolutionary biology, rhetoric of science, tree of life, 
visual rhetoric, visual tradition 
Introduction  
In December 2014, a team of 200 scientists from 80 labs published 
eight studies of avian genomes in the journal Science, 
simultaneously with 20 additional papers in other journals, all the 
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results of a coordinated effort to understand the evolutionary 
history of birds. One of the major results showed that modern birds 
originate from only four dinosaurian lineages that survived mass 
extinction 66 million years ago, as demonstrated by a massive 
computer-generated tree diagram (Jarvis et al., 2014).1 Tree 
diagrams have been widely used by biologists for decades to 
understand the evolutionary history of biological organisms. They 
are perhaps the most important tool for explaining how, through a 
long, gradual process of mutation and adaptation, a dinosaur can 
become a bird. This particular tree and the associated projects 
make new arguments about avian evolution, many of which were 
widely reported in popular media: for example, that falcons are 
more closely related to parrots than they are to other birds of prey 
such as eagles, owls, and vultures; that all modern birds are 
descended from a dinosaurian ancestor that had once had teeth but 
lost them 116 million years ago; that a “big bang” of bird speciation 
occurred shortly after the extinction of the dinosaurs 66 million 
years ago, when most types of modern birds appeared; and that 
song-learning evolved three separate times (Jarvis et al., 2014; 
Pennisi, 2014; Zhang et al., 2014).  
What is novel about this evolutionary tree are the data that were 
used to generate it: as emphasized in the flagship paper (Jarvis et 
al., 2014), the relationships were built from whole-genome data, 
rather than a set of morphological characteristics or a few selected 
genes or proteins. In their introduction to the Science issue, the 
authors claim that the massive amount of data used to generate this 
tree resolves some long-standing disputes about the “timing and 
topology of [bird species’] radiation,” that is, the time in history 
these species evolved and how they are related to each other (Zhang 
et al., 2014). Erich Jarvis, one of the lead researchers on this 
breakthrough project, explained in an interview with Scientific 
American that this new tree “contradicts morphology-based trees. 
It contradicts mitochondrial trees. It supports more trees based 
upon nuclear genes, although those trees weren’t highly resolved 
and this one is” (Mirsky, 2014). The tree’s new features raise new 
questions and generate new arguments regarding the complicated 
evolutionary history of the avian class; it thus acts not only as an 
illustration of the data that generated it, but also as an inventional 
tool.  
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Tree-like visualizations have played a critical role in taxonomic 
work for centuries, and the idea of a “tree of life” has been a 
pervasive notion not only in biology but also in religion, philosophy, 
and literature for much longer. It is a central figure in Charles 
Darwin’s Origin of Species in both verbal and visual forms. In 
summarizing his argument about natural selection, Darwin says 
this, in a widely quoted passage:  
The affinities2 of all the beings of the same class have 
sometimes been represented by a great tree . . . As buds 
give rise by growth to fresh buds, and these if vigorous, 
branch out and overtop on all sides many a feebler 
branch, so by generation I believe it has been with the 
great Tree of Life, which fills with its dead and broken 
branches the crust of the earth, and covers the surface 
with its ever branching and beautiful ramifications. (pp. 
129–130) 
One of Darwin’s earliest intimations of the idea that would become 
the Origin was a tree-like diagram in an 1837 notebook. And 
although Darwin used only one tree diagram in the entire Origin, 
Alan Gross has argued that it is so central that a “view of the Origin 
as a book with one diagram is mistaken; it is really a diagram so 
complex that it takes a whole book to unfold its meaning” (2007, p. 
67). Darwin himself considered the diagram so central to his 
argument about how species arose that he insisted on its necessity 
with his publisher, calling it “indispensable to show the nature of 
the very complex affinities of past & present animals” ([1859b]).3  
Since Darwin, “tree thinking” has become central to biology, and 
the tree has become “the single most powerful and most often used 
image of evolutionary history,” (Archibald, 2014, p. 22); entire 
textbooks are devoted to generating and interpreting such 
diagrams. The term “tree thinking” was introduced by Robert 
O’Hara to epitomize the explanatory task of converting questions of 
state into questions of process (1988b), a conversion the rhetorician 
might think of as a change of stasis from existence to cause. In 
other words, instead of treating the question “why are flamingos 
pink?” as a question about the present state of pinkness (to which 
the answer is diet and metabolism), the evolutionary biologist must 
learn to think of it as a question about history and change (how and 
 
2 We will have more to say later about this term “affinities.” 
3 We are indebted to William Kimler for pointing this out to us.  
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when did pinkness become a species trait?). A 2005 perspective 
essay in Science claims that evolutionary trees, or phylogenies, 
“have become an essential element of modern biology,” pointing for 
example to their multiple uses in the AIDS epidemic. The authors 
note that the field of phylogenetics “is complex and rapidly 
changing, replete with a dense statistical literature, impassioned 
philosophical debates, and an abundance of highly technical 
computer programs” (Baum et al., 2005, p. 979). Another team of 
biologists notes that “Our conception of evolution and our 
interpretation of phylogenetic trees are intimately linked . . . How 
we interpret phylogenetic trees directly impacts our understanding 
of evolution” (Omland et al., 2008, p. 854). As cognitive and 
inventional tools, evolutionary tree diagrams are ripe for rhetorical 
inquiry. They have been continually adapted and modified for 
different rhetorical situations in response to a changing discipline 
and to changing media. With rhetoricians turning their attention to 
the role of visuals in science, it seems worthwhile to take a closer 
look at the role of tree diagrams in evolutionary thought. 
What we aim to do here is to extend Gross’s discussion of 
Darwin’s diagram by placing it into the historical context of the 
development of tree diagrams in the biological sciences both before 
and after Darwin. Given its endurance and its centrality to 
biological thought, we are interested in understanding what 
rhetorical role the visualization of the “tree of life” has played in the 
development of evolutionary thinking. As one of the most powerful 
and pervasive images in biological thought, what conceptual work 
and what communicative work has it enabled? What does the tree 
form “mean”? How have the visual qualities and elements of the 
tree form changed over time as they have interacted with 
developing biological issues? We propose to address these 
questions by examining the pre-Darwinian history of tree images, 
the significance of “tree-thinking” in Darwin’s thought, and the 
rhetorical work of the major forms of post-Darwinian tree 
diagrams. Through tracing this history, we see evidence of four 
separate traditions of visualization: a cosmological tradition, a 
logical-philosophical tradition, a genealogical tradition, and a 
materialist tradition. These traditions are not consistent with each 
other; they arose for different reasons, inform different ways of 
reading the meaning of the tree form, and thus influence the way 
we think visually about biological relations. They represent 
historically contingent assumptions that condition the meanings of 
the images they produce. Their differences have led to problems 
that the sciences of phylogenetics and systematics are still dealing 
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with. In short, evolutionary tree diagrams have been a central 
rhetorical mechanism in the emergence of evolutionary theory, as 
these visualizations and their changing forms and interpretations 
shaped and constrained scientific thinking about the natural world.  
Visual Rhetoric and Tree Diagrams 
Tree diagrams are used to show structured relationships, including 
hierarchies (such as organization charts), classifications (such as 
branches of knowledge or computer file structures), and process or 
chronology (such as decision trees, flowcharts, or genealogies). 
There is little agreement on what a tree diagram must look like: 
whether it must be oriented with a root at the bottom or can be 
inverted or presented sideways. Manuel Lima’s book on tree 
diagrams takes a broad approach, including not only vertical and 
horizontal trees but also multidirectional, radial, rectangular, and 
other forms that do not look much like trees at all but do serve the 
function of “portray[ing] hierarchical structures” (2014, p. 11). 
Gunther Kress and Theo van Leeuwen’s discussion of the semiotic 
capacities of tree diagrams focuses on their role in classification 
(1996, pp. 79–89). However, they complicate their discussion by 
distinguishing two structures of representation: trees that are 
narrative, presenting “unfolding actions and events, processes of 
change, transitory spatial arrangements,” and trees that are 
conceptual, presenting “generalized and more or less stable and 
timeless essence” in terms of “class, structure or meaning” (1996, 
pp. 56, 79). Narrative structures have “vectors,” that is, 
directionality, whereas “conceptual structures never do” (1996, p. 
57). There is thus a fundamental ambivalence in the tree image, and 
as Kress and van Leeuwen note, such diagrams “can blur the 
boundaries between the dynamic and the static” (1996, p. 84). In 
fact, as we shall see in what follows, this ambivalence dogs the long 
history of tree of life diagrams, and it echoes the change of stasis 
from existence to cause required by “tree thinking,” as noted 
earlier.  
Two recent studies in the developing literature on the visual 
rhetoric of science address tree of life diagrams directly. One study 
examines tree diagrams in contemporary public communication 
about biological evolution. Han Yu evaluated 218 diagrams from 
145 articles in popular science magazines, finding that many do not 
accurately represent the principles of evolutionary biology and are 
likely to be misinterpreted by their public audiences (2018). Our 
research suggests that the reasons for this situation are historically 
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complicated: that the misinterpretations result in part from 
scientific debates about evolutionary theory itself and in part from 
the competing visual traditions that influence the construction and 
interpretation of these diagrams.  
We have already mentioned the other study, Gross’s deeply 
contextualized discussion of the conceptual and rhetorical work 
done by the tree diagram in Darwin’s Origin. Gross sees Darwin’s 
achievement in this diagram not only as a distillation of the book’s 
entire argument but also as an important step in making biology a 
truly modern science (2007, p. 62). In later work with Joseph 
Harmon, Gross characterizes modern science as “Heideggerian,” 
based on the philosopher’s view of science as objectifying the world 
into a “picture” or image; Heidegger, they say, was the first 
philosopher “who saw clearly that visualization was central to the 
sciences” (2014, p. 19). In their account of Heidegger, objectifying 
the world as a picture turns it into “spatiotemporal magnitudes of 
motion” that can be expressed as “a calculable nexus of forces” 
(quoted in 2014, pp. 7, 13, 27). They thus connect visualization with 
calculation as essential to modern science, and we will see this 
relationship foregrounded in what we have called the “materialist” 
tradition of tree diagrams, which developed in the early 20th 
century.4  
Many studies on visual rhetoric in science concern the 
relationships between the verbal and the visual aspects of an 
argument and the differing affordances of these two modes,5 or as 
Gross and Harmon put it, the “division of communicative, semiotic, 
and epistemic labor between words and images” (2014, p. 31). 
Although J. L. Lemke has observed that the verbal mode excels at 
expressing the “typological,” that is, creating categories and 
expressing differences and relationships, whereas the visual mode 
excels at the “topological,” that is, expressing continuous change, 
covariation, spatial relationships, and dynamic emergence (1998, p. 
 
4 By our term “materialist,” we mean to invoke scientific materialism, 
not rhetorical new materialism. Scientific materialism (sometimes called 
“physicalism”) is an older (17th-18th century) monist view holding that 
existence or reality consists only of spatiotemporal matter (Stoljar, 2017), 
whereas contemporary new materialism, also monist, aims to combine or 
blend dualisms such as subject/object, culture/nature, mental/physical, 
and the like (for example Gries, 2015).  
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87), tree diagrams challenge this division of cognitive labor, since 
as noted earlier they can show (or posit) categories (or types), as 
well as process and change.  
Because the verbal and visual modes are so distinct and so 
differently capable, Gross has claimed that “rhetorical theory as it is 
traditionally conceived cannot be legitimately ‘stretched’ to include 
the visual. Just as does the verbal, the visual requires treatment 
that is sui generis” (2009, p. 149). As a result, he adopts dual 
coding theory from cognitive psychology, which posits that verbal 
perception and visual perception require two separate cognitive 
processing systems, with different representational units and 
different associative systems that produce different responses; he 
grounds his analytical system for visuals on Gestalt psychology and 
Peircean semiotics (Gross, 2009; Gross & Harmon, 2014). 
However, we are reluctant to dispense with rhetoric as an approach 
to understanding scientific visualization. And there is some 
precedent for retaining it: after all, if Heidegger emphasizes the 
visual, so does Aristotle, according to George Kennedy (Aristotle, 
2007, p. 222). But we will also introduce three more recent 
witnesses to support our case.  
The first witness for the defense of rhetoric in scientific 
visualization must be Jeanne Fahnestock’s work on figuration. In 
spite of her statement that the visual is an area in which “the 
discipline of rhetoric itself needs to be enriched to hold up its part 
in the rhetoric of science” (2005, p. 279), she has demonstrated 
that patterns used to describe verbal expression and arguments, 
such as antithesis and incrementum, can also describe 
visualizations (1999). She points out, for another example, that 
parallelism “is a mental perception that can be produced visually as 
well as verbally,” and those productions, as “formal devices,” can 
reinforce an argument that is based on a series of supporting 
examples (2003, pp. 124-125).  
A second witness is the work by Lynda Walsh on topical systems 
in science. She shows that in inventing and composing visuals for 
research publication, researchers rely on rhetorical topoi, which she 
defines as “beliefs, norms, values, and commonplaces that shape . . . 
discourse” (2018, p. 6); examples of important scientific topoi used 
this way include change over time, comparison, and degree. 
Moreover, Walsh makes the case that some topoi can be found in 
multiple semiotic modes (the verbal, visual, and gestural, which she 
calls “channels of communication”); she thus challenges the 
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necessity for dual coding theory and hypothesizes that “the 
processes of visual invention and composition are fundamentally 
continuous and are scaffolded on top of basic cognitive operations” 
(2018, p. 25).  
Our third witness for the utility of rhetoric in understanding 
scientific visuals is Jonathan Buehl’s book Assembling Arguments, 
which shows how the verbally oriented rhetorics of Chaim 
Perelman and Kenneth Burke can illuminate scientific visualization 
(2016). Of particular interest to us is Buehl’s emphasis on what 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca call the starting points of 
argument, or “objects of agreement” (2016, pp. 30-32), as ways of 
explicating the functions and effects of scientific visuals. The 
“objects of agreement” that serve as starting points include 
agreements about the real (facts, truths, and presumptions) and 
agreements about the preferable (values, topoi, and hierarchies). 
Such agreements lie in the background of verbal argument, as well 
as in the visual contributions to argument, often unexpressed and 
implicit. We suggest that they can serve as what Toulmin calls 
“warrants” or “backing,” that is, the premises upon which 
interlocutors are understood to agree and which help to constitute 
an “argument field” such as a scientific discipline (1958). Such 
agreements are not limited to discrete, propositional facts or 
maxims but tie into wide networks of prior knowledge, cultural 
memory, and belief systems about the way the world is and the way 
it should be. As premises to enthymemes, whether expressed or 
presumed, they condition orientations to inquiry and expectations 
about results. Thomas Kuhn called these community-defining 
agreements “disciplinary matrices,” suggesting that they include 
symbolic generalizations (or scientific laws), metaphysical 
paradigms (which include models and metaphors), values, and 
exemplars (or model problem-solutions) (1962, pp. 182-187). Burke 
ties these background agreements specifically to language, to the 
way that our terminologies direct our attention in particular ways 
and thus “screen” or filter our perceptions and interpretations; he 
claims that what “we take as observations about ‘reality’ may be but 
the spinning out of possibilities implicit in our particular choice of 
terms” (1966, p. 46). 
Our point here is that visualizations, like verbal expressions, are 
used and interpreted in contexts that are complexes of such 
agreements, and our hypothesis for the discussion that follows is 
that what we identified above as “traditions” of visualizing the tree 
of life serve rhetorically as enthymematic premises for interpreting 
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tree diagrams—that is, as prior agreements about the real and the 
preferable that serve as backing or presumptions about what a 
particular diagram can mean, how it means, and how it functions in 
a line of thinking about biology. As historians of scientific imagery 
Lüthy and Smets observe, “The meaning of a given image can only 
be grasped in the context of the epistemological, metaphysical and 
social assumptions within which it is embedded” (2009, p. 398). A 
tradition, in the sense we are using it, is an historically sedimented 
configuration of such assumptions or “objects of agreement”; these 
assumptions make the tree of life a familiar concept that already 
has a set of possible meanings, reflecting and reinforcing that same 
configuration. The fact that such traditions provide interpretive 
contexts for not only the visual but also the verbal components of 
argument helps explain how they reinforce each other.  
Our term “visual traditions” has affinities with the ways that 
others have taught us to understand images in historical context. 
For example, Roland Barthes, speaking about photography and 
images in advertising, notes that there is a “historical grammar of 
iconographic connotation,” that is, a “cultural code” that informs a 
photograph’s “‘connoted message” (1977, pp. 22, 46). Art historian 
Michael Baxandall examines how Italians in the 15th century, both 
painters and public, “attended to visual experience in distinctively 
Quattrocento ways and how the quality of this attention became a 
part of their pictorial style,” summarizing these as a socially 
conditioned “period eye” (1988, pp. 27, 29). More generally, the 
great art historian Erwin Panofsky emphasizes that the 
interpretation of three strata of visual meaning (primary subjects, 
conventions, and symbols) must be “supplemented and corrected 
by an insight into historical processes the sum total of which may 
be called tradition” (1955, p. 39). 
We hope our notion of visual-rhetorical traditions can 
complement and perhaps extend recent discussions of critical 
approaches to visual rhetoric, like those of Cara Finnegan (2010) 
and Laurie Gries (2015). To take Finnegan’s discussion, for 
example, traditions, as we are conceiving them, influence all five of 
the approaches she identifies: the production, composition, 
reproduction, circulation, and reception of tree-of-life diagrams 
(2010, p. 252). Although Gries has a somewhat similar scheme 
(with a particular focus on circulation), she also emphasizes several 
principles of rhetorical new materialism (such as becoming and 
virality) that draw attention to the dynamic, emergent nature of 
images and their future transformations (2015, pp. 86-87). Our 
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emphasis on traditions pulls in the reverse direction, toward the 
past, providing a deep intertextual framework for production, 
composition, reproduction, circulation, and reception. 
Tree Diagrams before Darwin 
The pre-Darwinian history of the tree of life shows this image to be 
more complex and polysemic than the simple tree form might 
suggest. In the first place, the history is a very long one, with the 
pre-historical mythologies of many cultures using a tree of life 
motif, in both verbal and visual forms (Hacking, 2007, pp. 224-225; 
Hellström, 2012, pp. 245-246; James, 1966). For example, many 
artifacts from ancient Assyria show a highly stylized tree form 
representing a sacred tree of life (Lima, 2014, pp. 16-17), the Nordic 
tradition features the “world-tree” Yggdrasil that supports the earth 
and the heavens,6 and the creation story in the Book of Genesis 
makes reference to a tree of life in the Garden of Eden. This verbal 
image became deeply embedded in Christian iconography, being 
visualized in illuminated manuscripts, sculpture, and decorative 
architectural elements throughout Christian Europe. Beyond 
signifying life itself, and the sustenance of human life in particular, 
the tree image came to represent the specific relationship between 
the earthly and the divine worlds, a hierarchical set of connections 
between the low and the high, the imperfect and the divine. This is 
the tradition of visualization that we are calling “cosmological.”  
The cosmological tradition is epitomized in the scala naturae, or 
Great Chain of Being, a representation that is sometimes more 
ladder-like than tree-like, as the name suggests. This image, 
primarily in verbal form, is “one of the half-dozen most potent and 
persistent presuppositions in Western thought,” according to 
Arthur O. Lovejoy (1936, p. vii). The scala naturae represents the 
universe as “composed of an immense, or . . . of an infinite number 
of links ranging in hierarchical order” from barely existent up to the 
perfect being, with each link differing from those above and below 
it by the “‘least possible’ degree of difference” (Lovejoy, 1936, p. 
59). It has sources in both Plato’s idea of the Good and Aristotle’s 
attempts to systematize the natural world, but it is most fully 
developed in Christian neo-Platonism (Lovejoy, 1936, p. 61). Some 
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version in Figure 1 shows the cosmos as a tree-like structure, 
arrayed in hierarchical ranks, from devils at the bottom, up through 
plants, animals, fish, birds, humans, and angels, to the deity at the 
top, all connected by a single chain held in the right hand of the 
deity falling down through the center.  
Lovejoy claims that the Great Chain of Being reflects three 
principles of world-ordering: plenitude (that is, it includes all 
possible forms of existence), continuity (there are no gaps), and 
“unilinear gradation” (a single hierarchy), with a vertical scale of 
perfection, or actualization of goodness (1936, pp. 58-59, 61). 
Lovejoy also notes that the Great Chain of Being incorporates 
contradictory notions: from Plato both otherworldliness and its 
opposite, and from Aristotle both “the habit of thinking in discrete 
well-defined class-concepts and that of thinking in terms of 
continuity, of infinitely delicate shadings-off of everything into 
something else” (1936, p. 57). These contradictions can be read 
from the diagram. It shows the relationship between the divine 
realm and the material world as a link in the continuous chain 
similar to that between the animate and inanimate worlds; this 
continuity is in tension, however, with the depiction of discrete 
levels clearly distinct from one another. In Lemke’s terms, the Great 
Chain of Being attempts to be simultaneously typological and 
topological (1998). We can also see that it is, in Kress and van 
Leeuwen’s terms, primarily conceptual, showing a stable structure 
of the cosmos, but at the same time there is a narrative-like 
trajectory, drawing us upward toward the perfection of the divine.  
The cosmological tradition of tree-thinking survived in 
Enlightenment efforts to rationalize the natural world, as natural 
philosophers like Linnaeus, Buffon, Lamarck, Diderot, Cuvier, and 
Darwin’s own grandfather, Erasmus Darwin (Bowler, 1989), 
struggled to understand the grand harmonious plan assumed both 
by natural theologians and by rational mechanists to structure the 
universe. One visual example is provided by Charles Bonnet’s 
“Concept of a Ladder of Natural Beings,” 1745.7 This diagram is a 
simple vertical ladder, with overtly religious imagery removed and 
only observable phenomena included, from fire, air, water, earth, 
and metals on the bottom rungs; to plants, insects, shellfish, 
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Figure 1. The Great Chain of Being, from the Rhetorica christiana by Fray 
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serpents, fish, birds, and quadrupeds on higher rungs; and humans 
at the top. Bonnet emphasizes the principle of continuity, confident 
that “missing links” will be found: “Shall we judge of the chain of 
beings by our present knowledge? . . . The gap that we find between 
the vegetable and the mineral will apparently some day be filled up 
. . . to demonstrate the admirable gradation there is between all 
beings” (quoted in Lovejoy, 1936, p. 233). His diagram, then, is an 
expression of confidence in the principle of continuity. Both these 
figures show higher and lower orders of being, but they indicate no 
other relationships (i.e., no branching) or chronology: as depictions 
of a permanent creation, there is no need for an historical 
dimension. 
Even today, the scala naturae persists in contemporary biology. 
In the words of the title of a recent article in the journal Evolution: 
Education and Outreach, “The great chain of being is still here” 
(Rigato & Minelli, 2013). As the authors claim, “We should not 
expect in the current professional literature in biology, and 
evolutionary biology in particular, any survival of scala naturae 
thinking, or of the corresponding language” because of its hierarchy 
and its “complete lack of historical perspective. . . . These 
expectations, however, fail to be supported by facts” (Rigato & 
Minelli, 2013, p. 1). This data-mining study of over 60,000 
biological articles published in major biology journals between 
2005 and 2010, found “ladder” language in over 1000 of the 
articles, such as “higher” and “lower,” “primitive” and “advanced” 
forms of life, and placement of humans as “highest.” A similar 
critique in Nature notes that many presentations of evolution 
“mirror the great chain by viewing the process as progressive” and 
by habitually placing the human species at the top of visual 
representations (Nee, 2005; see also Omland et al., 2008). 
Likewise, Yu’s study of popular science magazines, mentioned 
earlier, found visual orientations that “promote an incorrect, 
progressive reading of evolution” (2018, p. 100).  
Closely related to the scala naturae is the second visual tradition, 
the representation of logical relationships in tree form. Logic trees 
are usually traced to a 3rd-century verbal description by Porphyry in 
his introduction to Aristotelian logic (Isagoge), where he explains 
genus–species relationships as a sequence of hierarchical 
subordinations, or as analysis by dichotomous division; this work 
became the basis for most medieval instruction in logic. The earliest 
visual representation of this set of relationships in the Western 
tradition occurred in the 9th century (Hacking, 2007, p. 232), but 
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such tree diagrams became ubiquitous only in the 13th century, 
beginning with Peter of Spain’s influential work on logic written 
around 1235. According to Ian Hacking, Peter “clearly understood 
the logical form of his diagram [as] . . . not merely a representation 
of a text of Porphyry’s” but as a “relationship of abstraction” (2007, 
p. 245), with the most abstract and inclusive category at the top, 
and a descending series of dichotomous divisions into more and 
more concrete categories. The 14th-century logic diagrams of the 
prolific Ramon Llull are less abstract and more tree-like, elaborated 
and ornamented with roots, branches, and leaves (Hacking, 2007), 
such as the one in Figure 2 from a 1512 edition of his Logica Nova, 
representing one version of medieval scholasticism. This tree 
represents from the top: being or substance, divided into essential 
and accidental; essence divided into corporeal and incorporeal; the 
corporeal, divided into animate and inanimate; the animate, 
divided into rational and irrational; and the (rational) human, 
divided into representative individuals, Plato and Socrates; with 
question (or inquiry) at the root (see Hacking, 2007, p. 248). 
 Logic trees are similar to the scala naturae in some ways but 
quite different in others. Since both represent eternal and universal 
relationships, neither has any place for chronology. In the vertical 
dimension, both represent hierarchy: of abstraction, or logical 
inclusion, in the former case and of perfection in the latter. But they 
are also quite different in that the scala naturae does not represent 
relations of inclusion from one level to another: angels do not 
“include” humans, whereas substance includes all of material 
reality.8 Although the principles of plenitude and continuity hold 
that there is a gradation between entities on each level in the Great 
Chain of Being, the relations of inclusion in the logic tree mean that 
the levels must be quite distinct from one another. Furthermore, in 
the horizontal dimension, the scala naturae indicates 
numerousness: there are many plants, birds, fish, humans, but 
fewer angels, and just one perfect divinity at the top. In contrast, 
logic trees in the Porphyrian tradition restrict themselves to 
dichotomous division, a practice consistent with Plato’s practice of  
 
8 Loosely. There are differences between Aristotle and his Christian 
medieval interpreters; and Aristotle wasn’t completely consistent, but for 
him substance is matter plus form (Robinson, 2018, p. 2.2.2).  
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Figure 2. Raymond Llull’s Arbor naturalis et logicalis (Tree of nature 
and logic), from Logica Nova (1305), 1512 edition. Wikimedia 
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dialectic and Aristotle’s early thinking on logic and metaphysics.9 
Thus, there are only two entities at each level, both of which are 
included in one of the two entities at the level just above.  
Centuries later, we see the influence of logic trees in the work of 
early modern natural philosophers, who were familiar with 
medieval logic from their own schooling. Given their assumption 
that the natural world is an orderly system, logic, that is, the 
method of dichotomous division, seemed the best tool for finding 
that order (Mayr, 1982, p. 159). Thus, we find the bracketed table, 
or dichotomous diagram, a distinct visual genre, appearing in the 
16th century to organize knowledge in many fields; according to 
Pietsch, who shows several examples, its earliest use to show 
similarities and differences among organisms was a 1555 
classification of wading birds (see also Lima, 2014, p. 102; 2012, p. 
11).10 Perhaps the most influential user of the bracketed table was 
Carl Linnaeus, who had excelled in the study of logic at school 
(Mayr, 1982, p. 173). As one historian notes: “Linnaeus's system of 
classification owes much to scholasticism . . . [it] was simply the 
result of filling in the abstract Tree with the names of actual 
species” (Franklin, 1986, pp. 246, 252). 
Linnaeus aimed to represent the rational plan of divine creation 
within his classification system, an ambition revealed in the title of 
his first work, the monumental Systema Naturae, published in 
1735 and republished in many continually expanded editions 
during his lifetime; he had, according to Ernst Mayr, an “obsession 
to classify” (1982, p. 172). He began with 18th century assumptions: 
that species were stable, that the relationships among them would 
reflect a single orderly system, and that this system would be a 
linear hierarchy much like the scala naturae. Many of his works 
include bracketed tree diagrams, and the example in Figure 3 shows 
dichotomous division used to map out the plant kingdom through  
 
9 In his later works on biology, Aristotle came to realize that dichotomy 
would not suffice to classify the complexity of the plants and animals he 
observed (see Aristotle, 1961, pp. I.iii.643b610-615; Leroi, 2014, pp. 111-
113). Interestingly, we will see dichotomy reappear in cladograms of the 
20th century.  
10 Bracketed tables were used in many other applications, with what 
Walter Ong calls a “cult of dichotomies” reaching a peak in the work of 
curricular reformer Peter Ramus and his followers in 16th-century France, 
primarily in the pedagogy of dialectic (1983, pp. 202, 199).  
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Figure 3. Linnaeus’s “Key to the Sexual System” of the Plant 
Kingdom, from Systema Naturae, 10th ed., 1758. This bracketed 
diagram uses dichotomous division based on medieval logic trees. 
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reproductive morphology. Mayr notes that he chose reproduction 
as the basis for his scheme of classification because it represented 
the “working plan of the creator” (1982, p. 178). 
Sideways trees such as this begin with an all-inclusive category on 
the left, breaking into smaller, more exclusive groups towards the 
right. The axes are turned 90 degrees from the earlier examples: the 
vertical axis is diversity or plenitude; the horizontal axis is logical 
inclusion or abstraction. Again time is not represented, as the 
primary motivation is to demonstrate groupings of similarity in a 
timeless system; thus, in Kress and van Leeuwen’s terms, they are 
purely classificational, with no narrative vector. Unlike the scala 
naturae or later branching diagrams but like the logic diagrams, 
there is no assumption of continuity between the divisions. But the 
principle of plenitude from the scala naturae is a driving force in 
the background, as the evidence of the diversity and fecundity of 
the natural world, revealed by the age of exploration and 
colonization, piled up in the great collections of the European 
naturalists, including Linnaeus’s own experimental garden in 
Uppsala and the royal collections in Paris with which French 
naturalists Buffon and Cuvier both worked. Linnaeus’s 
classifications and taxonomies brought order to the “threat of total 
chaos” and led to the “unprecedented flowering of taxonomic 
research” in the 18th and early 19th centuries, making Darwin’s work 
possible (Mayr, 1982, p. 173).  
But Linnaeus’s work contained inconsistencies, and these 
inconsistencies are grounded in his acceptance both of the 
principles of plenitude and continuity and of the discontinuities 
required by scholastic logic (Mayr, 1982, p. 172), as well as the 
strong presumption that species were sharply differentiated natural 
and eternal entities (Lovejoy, 1936, p. 227). But it gradually became 
apparent to the 18th century naturalists that a single ladder or scale 
just could not account for the diversity of the organic world 
(Lovejoy, 1936, p. 202; Ragan, 2009); that whatever the principle of 
ordering was, it could not be perfection, especially among plants, 
since it was difficult to see how one plant was more perfect than the 
next (Ragan, 2009); and that species might not be as fixed and 
permanent as assumed, given the evidence of hybridizing and of the 
development of multiple varieties by breeding. It was under these 
conditions of “crisis” (Ragan, 2009) that the third tradition of 
visualizing the tree of life became important. This is the 
genealogical tradition.  
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Genealogies, which represent family relationships as a tree, are 
distinctly different from both cosmological and logical tree 
representations because one of their dimensions (usually the 
vertical) represents time, a consideration absent from the other 
two. The genealogical tree has Biblical roots, with its apparent 
origin in a passage in Isaiah (11.1)11 predicting the descent of the 
Messiah and later depicted in Christian iconography as the Jesse 
tree, showing the genealogy of Jesus as descended from Jesse, the 
father of King David. The earliest such visual representation has 
been traced to the early 12th century (Hacking, 2007), after which 
they become “one of the most widely visible of medieval diagrams” 
(Franklin, 2000), in illuminated manuscripts, stained glass 
windows, and church sculpture.12 Most commonly, these images 
depict Jesse asleep at the bottom, with a tree or vine growing out of 
his side, subsequent ancestors layered on branches above him (the 
number depending on the pictorial space available), the Virgin at or 
near the top, and Jesus with or above her (Hacking, 2007, p. 229; 
Lima, 2014, pp. 32, 36). The vertical dimension thus depicts both 
time and continuity or relatedness, and since Jesse trees were never 
inverted, with Christ at the bottom (Klapisch-Zuber, 1991), they 
have a narrative directionality like that of the Great Chain of Being.  
Genealogical trees became important in secular contexts as ways 
to establish the claim to legitimate succession by a ruler and to sort 
out inheritance and marriage arrangements among the royal houses 
of Europe. The latter need was served by trees of consanguinity, 
which show blood relationships within a family. Church canon law 
forbade marriage within seven degrees of separation until 1215, 
when it was reduced to four, in part because the interrelated royal 
houses of Europe had such limited options for marriage. The 
earliest extant tree of consanguinity dates from the 9th century 
(Hacking, 2007, p. 228; Lima, 2014, p. 32). The earliest 
genealogical trees, dating from the 11th century, take the form of a 
single line of succession, much like the listing of “begats” in the 
 
11 The Gospel of Matthew begins with a detailed genealogy of Christ, 
listing 14 generations from Abraham to David, 14 generations from David 
to the Babylonian captivity, and another 14 generations to Christ 
(Matthew 1:1-17).  
12 Many examples are included in Lima (2014) and on Wikimedia 
Commons, including the oldest stained glass Jesse tree, at Chartres 
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Bible; because the inheritance system in feudal society was based 
on lineage, the “antiquity and continuity of one’s line” was “the 
fundamental structural mechanism of power and social 
reproduction” (Klapisch-Zuber, 1991, p. 107). These trees tended to 
begin with the founding ancestor at the top and the current 
generation at the bottom, consistent with language of “descent,” but 
Klapisch-Zuber argues that the narrative trajectory of the Jesse 
tree, with the origin at the bottom and Christ at the top, “breath[ed] 
new life into the arboreal metaphor” and “turn[ed] the trees 
around,” (1991, p. 120). Thus, by the 15th and 16th centuries, 
European genealogical trees tended to be organized with the past at 
the bottom and the top of the tree emphasizing not the singular line 
of succession but rather power through ascent and proliferation 
(Klapisch-Zuber, 1991, pp. 108–112).  
Genealogical trees were also put to use in other historical 
enterprises, in particular the effort to understand the diversity and 
origins of human languages. European exploration of what is now 
India revealed similarities between Sanskrit and the ancient 
European languages, Greek and Latin, leading to proposals in the 
latter half of the 18th century that these ancient languages had a 
common source. These observations, and a religious interest in 
discovering the “lingua Adamica,” the hypothesized original 
tongue, led to the development of historical linguistics 
(Hoenigswald, 1962). The first genealogical tree of languages was 
apparently published in about 1800 (O'Hara, 1996, p. 84), showing 
primitive languages at the bottom and the more “advanced” 
languages (modern English and French) at the top.13 In 1850, 
German philologist August Schleicher published a systematic study 
of European languages in which he described language 
development as an evolutionary process and “spoke of the Indo-
European languages in terms of family relationships” (Koerner, 
1972, pp. 260-262). He called his approach Stammbaumtheorie, 
family-tree theory, using tree diagrams to show groups of 
historically related languages. Although he was aware of much work 
in natural history (and later made much of the resonances between 
his work and Darwin’s), Schleicher may have developed his 
approach to language from his education as a classical philologist, 
trained to create manuscript stemmata according to the doctrine of 
shared errors (Hoenigswald, 1962, p. 8). His teacher, Friedrich 
Ritschl, worked also on human genealogy (Maher, 1966, p. 8), so 
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this tradition of tree diagrams may have served as a direct model 
for this form of representation in linguistic inquiry.  
In any case, the late 18th and early 19th centuries saw a flourishing 
of tree diagrams, as naturalists attempted to discover and represent 
the plan of the natural world, the “natural system” they were 
convinced had produced the diversity that seemed to increase with 
each discovery. Pietsch reproduces many of these diagrams and 
explains the hypotheses they represent. For one example, Figure 4 
shows a genealogy of strawberries from 1766 that attempts to 
account for anomalies observed in the royal gardens at Versailles by 
a horticulturalist, who observed that “the genealogical order is the 
only one nature indicates, the only order that fully satisfies the 
mind” (quoted in Pietsch, 2012, p. 27). The diagram shows the wild 
strawberry at the top with other varieties and their presumed or 
observed lines of descent.  
Biological thinking and visualization during this period were 
influenced by the developing science of geology. In the early 19th 
century, geologists developed visualizations that both represented 
and theorized geological structures and processes, including 
diagrams of vertical sections of the earth, abstractions from what 
one sees on the rock face of a quarry (Rudwick, 1976, p. §iv); these 
diagrams of strata were ladder-like, in the manner of those 
depicting the Great Chain of Being, but with a vertical scale 
representing not perfection but rather both space and time. For 
example, an 1840 geology textbook included a paleontological tree 
of life that is the first representation of geological time in a diagram 
of plant and animal relations (Pietsch, 2012, pp. 69–70, Fig. 54). 
The discovery of geological time, the study of fossils in geological 
strata, and the development of the science of paleontology are all a 
part of what Lovejoy calls “the temporalizing of the Great Chain of 
Being,” which he characterizes as “one of the principal happenings 
in eighteenth-century thought” (1936, p. 244). Against great 
intellectual and religious resistance, there was a spreading 
acceptance of the idea that nature was not immutable, that the 
natural system had not been created once and for all but rather had 
a history. Geologists, surveyors and mining engineers, and 
biologists slowly came to the conclusion that the earth itself had a 
history, a “deep history” (Rudwick, 2005): that geological strata 
were evidence of a time sequence and that the lowest strata, bearing 
fossil organisms quite unlike any living plants or animals, were the 
oldest (Mayr, 1982, p. 320). In 1796, Georges Cuvier, at the 
National Museum in Paris, published a comparison of fossil  
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Figure 4. Généalogie des Fraisiers (Genealogy of Strawberries), 
from Histoire Naturelle des Frasiers by Antoine-Nicolas 
Duchesne, 1766, facing p. 228. Hortalia: Bibliothéque de la 
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elephants (the new world mastodon and the Siberian mammoth) 
with living African and Indian elephants, concluding that they were 
four distinct species, with the fossil species apparently extinct; his 
subsequent 1812 four-volume work on fossils is now regarded as the 
“founding document of vertebrate paleontology” (Reiss, 2009, p. 
90). Extinction was a radical notion, inconsistent with faith in a 
benevolent and omnipotent Creator, but one that connected 
geology and biology and helped give a genealogical meaning to 
biological tree diagrams, “temporalizing” them, in Lovejoy’s terms.   
The many tree or tree-like biological diagrams produced during 
this period represent a set of experiments in classification and 
ordering, attempts to discover and describe the relationships 
among the multitudinous entities of the natural world. These 
relationships, premised on the principle of continuity, were called 
“affinities,”14 a term used to denote relationships of similarity. A 
key assumption driving the efforts of 18th-century naturalists was 
that affinities among species would define the natural system 
(O'Hara, 1991, p. 258; Ragan, 2009, § “The Search”); as Mayr notes, 
“There was a conviction that . . . [affinity] reflected some kind of 
causal relationship” (1982, p. 202). Thus, much of the work of these 
naturalists was directed to figuring out just which similarities were 
true affinities (such as those between penguins and ducks or auks) 
and which were mere analogies that did not reveal true 
relationships (such as those between penguins and seals). As late as 
1856, Alfred Russel Wallace, in a paper titled “Attempts at a 
Natural Arrangement of Birds,” remarks that ornithologists are in 
pretty good agreement about the major classification of birds, based 
on structure and “economy” (behavior) but that for the large class 
of perching birds (passeres), “No systematist has been satisfied 
with the arrangements of his predecessors, and, after an endless 
variety of divisions and subdivisions, we are as far off from any 
generally accepted system of arrangement as ever” (1856, p. 195). 
There follows a detailed discussion of the erroneous affinities that 
have been postulated between hummingbirds and sun birds, 
concluding that “In the case of these two families, a mere outward 
 
14 This term has a complex history. It was used in church law (as early as 
the 14th century) to describe relationship by marriage (in contrast to 
consanguinity, relationship by blood), in linguistics (as early as the 16th 
century) to describe similarities between languages, in chemistry (17th 
century) to describe attraction between substances, and in 18th-century 
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resemblance appears to have been universally mistaken for an 
affinity” (1856, p. 196). Figure 5 is one of the two tree-like diagrams 
Wallace offers in this paper after more discussion of the various 
true and false affinities in this group: “We have now completed a 
very brief and imperfect review of those families which we conceive 
can be separated from the mass of Passeres to form the tribe of the 
Fissirostres [the order that includes nightjars, swallows, and 
kingfishers], and in the accompanying diagram we have 
endeavoured to represent at one glance their various affinities” 
(Wallace, 1856, p. 205). 
 In this diagram, Wallace explains, “It is intended that the 
distances between the several names should show to some extent 
the relative amount of affinity existing between them; and the 
connecting lines show in what direction the affinities are supposed 
to lie” (1856, p. 206). The diagram is thus not chronological but 
shows what could be a cross-section of a genealogy at a specific 
moment in time. That Wallace may well have been thinking along 
these lines is strongly suggested by his publication of just a year 
earlier, in which he offers “the Law which has regulated the 
Introduction of New Species.” Observing that none of the 
explanations offered since the time of Linnaeus for the great 
diversity and geographic distribution of animals and plants has 
been satisfactory or has managed to keep up with the constant 
addition of new facts, Wallace notes that recent geological 
discoveries regarding the age of the earth and the “long and 
uninterrupted series of changes which it has undergone” can throw 
“a great light” on the problems of biology (1855, p. 184). The law he 
deduces from the facts of geography and geology is that “Every 
species has come into existence coincident both in space and time 
with a pre-existing closely allied species.” This law, he says, means 
that “the natural series of affinities will . . . represent the order in 
which the several species came into existence, each one having had 
for its immediate antitype [predecessor] a closely allied species 
existing at the time of its origin” (1855, p. 186). In effect, Wallace 
acknowledges the role of time in biology. Moreover, he thinks about 
the chronological processes involved as being tree-like: “The 
species [are] so numerous and the modifications of form and 
structure so varied, arising probably from the immense number of 
species which have served as antitypes for the existing species, thus 
produc[ing] a complicated branching of the lines of affinity, as 
intricate as the twigs of a gnarled oak” that “the whole difficulty of 
the true Natural System of classification becomes apparent to us” 
(1855, p. 187). He concludes that “the analogy of a branching tree  
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Figure 5. Diagram of the Affinities of the Fissirostres (Wallace, 1856, p. 
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[is] the best mode of representing the natural arrangement of 
species and their successive creation” (1855, p. 191).15  
The use of tree diagrams in pre-Darwinian biology is very much 
more complex than we have been able to portray here (Hellström, 
2012; O'Hara, 1988a, 1991, 1996; Pietsch, 2012), but we have said 
enough to make the point that the tree diagram is not a simple, self-
evident visual representation of anything. It can be constructed and 
read in multiple ways, and these are tied intimately to prevailing 
philosophical, cultural, and religious beliefs, which we have called, 
collectively, “traditions.” The cosmological tradition of visualization 
assumed that biological tree diagrams represented affinities that 
were signs of a divine order; the logical tradition saw affinities as 
relations of morphological and functional similarity that reveal the 
nested hierarchical structure of the system of nature; and the 
genealogical tradition made it possible to think that affinities were 
relations of descent. The lines, nodes, branches, and orientations on 
a tree diagram thus mean quite different things within these three 
traditions. We suggest that the combination of the genealogical 
tradition with the cosmological and the logical changed the 
framework for thinking about the natural world and made the 
theory of evolution possible.  
The Role of Tree Diagrams in Darwin’s 
Evolutionary Thought 
We have already mentioned that the “tree of life” is a central figure, 
in both verbal and visual forms, in Darwin’s argument in The 
Origin of Species. And indeed there has been significant research 
and commentary on Darwin’s use of tree diagrams (A. Gross, 2007; 
A. G. Gross, 2006; A. G. Gross & Harmon, 2014; Hellström, 2012). 
So our aim in this brief section will simply be to position Darwin’s 
use of the image within the framework we have used above. 
Darwin’s explanatory project was two-fold: to demonstrate that 
modern species had descended from earlier ones and to show how 
this could be so, that is, to find a mechanism for descent with 
modification (Dennett, 1995, p. 39). His solution involved random 
variation of features within a breeding population, continuity or 
 
15 This paper, which includes no diagrams, is not the one that spurred 
Darwin to publish in 1859 but a precursor to the 1858 paper that did so 
(Rosen, 2007).  
 
Miller 
Hartzog 27  Poroi 15,2 (May 2020) 
 
inheritability of variations, overproduction of offspring, and 
“natural selection” produced by competition for survival.  
Gross argues that Darwin’s overall argument is skillfully 
epitomized in the diagram included in the Origin: “once we 
understand the diagram, we understand Darwin,” he claims, adding 
that “its combination of conceptual complexity and graphic 
simplicity remains impressive” (2006, p. 97). The diagram, shown 
in Figure 6, is a schematic genealogical tree, or rather several trees, 
with differing amounts of branching, showing the (distant) past at 
the bottom and the present at the top; horizontal lines mark out 
equal measures of time, and dotted lines connect the generations of 
organisms. The trees are hypothetical, showing abstract ancestors 
and descendants rather than any specific organisms, such as birds 
or strawberries. Darwin’s explanation of the diagram culminates in 
the passage quoted in our introduction about the “great Tree of 
Life” (Darwin, 1859a, pp. 129–130).16 
Later in the Origin, Darwin observes that “Naturalists try to 
arrange the species, genera, and families in each class, on what is 
called the Natural System,” and he then asks, “But what is meant by 
this system?” (1859a, p. 413). His answer is that  
the natural system is founded on descent with 
modification; that the characters which naturalists consider 
as showing true affinity between any two or more species, 
are those which have been inherited from a common 
parent, and, in so far, all true classification is genealogical; 
that community of descent is the hidden bond which 
naturalists have been unconsciously seeking, and not some  
 
16 Gross (2006, pp. 90–96) and Hellström (2012, pp. 235–236) both 
detail the tree diagrams in Darwin’s notebooks, over 20 years before the 
Origin, demonstrating the inventional role they played in Darwin’s 
thinking. Both Hellström (2012, p. 235) and O’Hara (1996, p. 81) note 
that the diagram in Darwin’s 1837 notebook is probably the first 
genuinely evolutionary tree diagram. This diagram can be viewed in an 
online exhibition at the American Museum of Natural History 
(http://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/past-exhibitions/darwin/the-idea-
takes-shape/i-think) and in context of the complete 1837 notebook at 
http://darwin-online.org.uk/content/frameset?itemID=CUL-DAR121.-
&viewtype=image&pageseq=1 at p. 36. It is also reproduced in Gross 
(2006, p. 92). 
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Figure 6. Darwin’s Tree Diagram in The Origin of Species (1859), 
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unknown plan of creation, or the enunciation of general 
propositions, and the mere putting together and separating 
objects more or less alike. (1859a, p. 420)  
As Burke points out, Darwin emphasizes the principle of continuity 
between humans and other animals (indeed, all of life), whereas 
those with a more theologically inflected terministic screen require 
discontinuity and hierarchy (1966, p. 50), and this is precisely the 
difference visualized in the genealogical and the cosmological 
traditions.  
Gross argues that Darwin’s diagram combines genealogical trees 
with the “geological column,” in which time is portrayed in the 
vertical space both of geological strata and of the diagram on the 
page (A. Gross, 2007, p. 75; A. G. Gross, 2006, p. 96); the 
connection with geology provides the bottom-up orientation of the 
tree diagram, but for Darwin the narrative vector is one of time, not 
cosmological perfection. Our point is that only against the context 
we have presented involving the long and influential traditions of 
cosmological and logical tree diagrams can we truly appreciate 
Darwin’s argumentative achievement here, the revolutionary nature 
of his rejection of both of those traditions that had so strongly 
influenced previous tree diagrams. Darwin’s diagram insists that we 
must understand affinities as evidence of descent and ancestry, that 
the natural system is not a hierarchical classification but rather a 
set of family relationships. It draws on a different visual tradition, 
requiring us to see the tree of life in a new way.  
Tree Diagrams After Darwin 
The use of genealogical tree diagrams became widespread in many 
fields of biology in the decades after Darwin, being especially useful 
in vertebrate biology as comparative anatomists and 
paleontologists worked to understand extensive dinosaur finds 
(Ragan, 2009). As Mark Ragan concludes, the genealogical tree 
diagram after Darwin became a “landmark not only of biology . . . 
but of modern intellectual and visual culture as well” (2009, § 
"Conclusion"). Nevertheless, we also find remnants of the 
cosmological and logical traditions surviving in many of these 
images, and, in the early 20th century, the emergence of diagrams 
deriving from our fourth tradition of visualization, the materialist.  
The most notable of the later 19th-century diagrams are the many 
trees published by Ernst Haeckel, the German naturalist, 
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philosopher, and illustrator. Haeckel was first exposed to Darwin’s 
ideas in 1861 and quickly became one of his strongest supporters 
and popularizers. Unlike Darwin’s abstract diagram, those of 
Haeckel were specific, “palaeontologically grounded” attempts to 
map the relationships among actual organisms and known and 
hypothesized ancestors (quoted in Richards, 2014, p. 162).17 
Haeckel was the first to publish a tree showing a single origin for 
plants, animals, and protists (Pietsch, 2012); he coined the word 
“phylogeny” (Dayrat, 2003) and proposed the “biogenetic law” that 
“ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny,” an idea that is no longer 
accepted (Dayrat, 2003; Richards, 2014). His books, published in 
multiple editions and translated into many languages, were 
influential and sometimes controversial.  
Haeckel’s tree diagrams range from simple line diagrams and 
bracketed lists to a “phylogeography” (a branching tree 
superimposed on a map) and elaborate multi-branching pictorial 
trees showing the relations of various groups of plants and animals. 
The most famous and most frequently reproduced (Pietsch, 2012, p. 
100) is the “great oak” family tree of humans (Figure 7). Originally 
published in German in 1874 and intended for a general educated 
readership, this is perhaps the most pictorial of all Haeckel’s trees. 
It is distinctive, also, in recalling earlier images of the scala 
naturae, which it does in at least two ways. First, the thick trunk 
dominates the page, diminishing the importance of the short, 
twiggy branches and focusing the attention on the dramatic vertical 
line connecting the human race, at the top, to its progenitors in the 
trunk below. Second, the vertical scale, or y-axis of the image, 
marked out by dotted horizontal lines, is labeled not with units of 
time, as Darwin’s was, but with the major classifications of living 
creatures, single-celled organisms at the base, followed by 
invertebrates, vertebrates, and mammals at the top. Thus, although 
Haeckel was known as “the German Darwin,” this diagram reverts 
to a pre-Darwinian scheme, in which the vertical axis is a scale of 
progress, not unlike the Great Chain of Being. Six of the 20 trees by 
Haeckel that Pietsch reproduces have y-axes that are labeled, but 
this is the only one in which the labels are not geological time-
periods. Haeckel’s Darwinism, according to Dayrat, is complicated 
by a residual commitment to the scala naturae, to a conviction that  
 
17 Haeckel was a colleague and friend of Schleicher, the philologist 
mentioned earlier, with whom he shared many ideas, including ideas 
about stammbaumtheorie (Dayrat, 2003; Richards, 2014).  
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Figure 7. Haeckel’s “Pedigree of Man” from The Evolution 
of Man: A Popular Exposition of the Principal Points of 
Human Ontogeny and Phylogeny. New York: Appleton & 
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“organisms are ordered along a scale of progress from lower to 
higher organisms” (2003, p. 526). Haeckel called his diagrams 
stämmbaume, or pedigrees, not phylogenies; that is, “the 
information conveyed . . . was the succession of main stages along 
the trunk,” not the pattern of branching (Dayrat, 2003, pp. 524, 
526). His diagrams, of which the “great oak” is just the most 
dramatic example, trace the pedigree of a particular species or 
group back through its progenitors; Haeckel considers this as the 
ontogeny of a species, in contrast to the embryological and 
developmental ontogeny of a particular organism18 and in contrast 
to a phylogeny, which would show the species in a larger 
evolutionary context (Richards, 2014, pp. 141-142). To many 
observers the design produces a non-Darwinian teleological effect, 
with humans as the ultimate product of evolution, rising out of the 
succession of more primitive life-forms.19  
The cosmological tradition died hard, and in the book where this 
diagram appeared, on the sensational topic of The Evolution of 
Man, it had a clear rhetorical appeal, the teleology compensating 
for the radical notion that humans were descended from “lower” 
forms of life. Haeckel has been accused of inconsistency and 
muddleheadedness in his attempt to blend Darwinian genealogy 
with German Romanticism (Dayrat, 2003, pp. 523, 526; Richards, 
2014, p. 263),20 and we can see the result in the ambivalence of this 
particular image, which is both cosmological and genealogical. Such 
polysemy can be rhetorically productive, as Leah Ceccarelli has 
argued (1998), so it may not only reflect the ambivalence of 
Haeckel’s own thinking but also appeal differently to popular and to 
scientific readers and allow scientific readers to preserve familiar 
religious ways of thinking even as it invokes the science of 
paleontology. And in fact, non-Darwinian teleology (a narrative 
 
18 Haeckel produced many diagrams of this type as well, showing the 
embryological development of various species. See Fahnestock’s 
discussion of this type of diagram (2003).  
19 It should be noted that Richards resists this interpretation, not 
recognizing the visual and intellectual imprint of the scala naturae that 
Dayrat describes (Richards, 2014, pp. 141-142, 161-162).  
20 Haeckel has also been accused of supporting social Darwinism and 
scientific racism, but these charges are controversial (see Richards, 2014, 
pp. 270-276, 448-453).  
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vector of “progress”) continues to influence evolutionary biology 
well into the 20th century (Ruse, 2009, 2013a).  
In the early 20th century, biologists began to construct tree 
diagrams using specific, observable characteristics to hypothesize 
relationships among different species of plants and animals. Many 
of these were published mid-century by William King Gregory, 
using morphological characteristics such as teeth, cranial shape, 
and hand shape in primates (see Pietsch, 2012, pp. Figs. 163, 164, 
172, and 173). But perhaps the earliest tree of this type was 
published by Peter Chalmers Mitchell in 1901 showing the 
intestinal tracts of birds (Figure 8). Mitchell’s tree uses drawings of 
intestinal tracts as the nodes, showing presumable phylogenetic 
relationships as branches. This tree is significant as it was one of 
the first to use a single, specific characteristic to create a phylogeny 
of that characteristic; this type of diagram would later be called a 
“character-state tree.” Mitchell cautioned that a character tree did 
not necessarily represent the phylogeny of any other character or 
even the phylogeny of “these impermanent combinations of 
characters that we call species” (quoted in Pietsch, 2012, p. 150).  
In Mitchell’s focus on the details of specific characters we can see 
early evidence of our fourth tradition of visualization in tree 
diagrams, the materialist tradition. His apparent anxiety about his 
character trees being misinterpreted as true phylogenies of species 
(and about the “species” concept itself) is emblematic of a 
widespread concern that the taxonomic methods of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries lacked any “rigorous 
methodology (especially compared with the newly developing fields 
of genetics and experimental embryology)” (Cracraft & Donoghue, 
2004, p. 1) and relied too much on “the intuitive judgment of the 
expert and even on artistic and pragmatic criteria” (Pietsch, 2012, 
p. 255). Indeed, there were “serious problems” in biological 
classification at this time and no agreement on standards for 
recognizing higher taxa (such as family, order, class) (Mayr, 1982, 
p. 221). The need for more inductive empirical methods that could 
supplant traditional reliance on deduction from a priori principles 
(Hull, 1988, p. 117) was met by a number of transforming 
developments in biology. One of these developments occurred in 
1900 when English botanist William Bateson delivered a paper to 
the Royal Horticultural Society reintroducing the work of Gregor 
Mendel (Ruse, 2013b, p. 273). Over the course of the next several 
decades, Mendel’s work on the inheritance of dominant and 
recessive traits was reconceptualized in the context of Darwinian  
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Figure 8. Intestinal Tract of Birds, an Early Character-State Tree 
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evolution to create a theory of genetics extending to entire 
populations (Ruse, 2013b). 
A second development was the development of the Hardy-
Weinberg equilibrium principle. Working independently in 1908, 
G. H. Hardy, in England, and Wilhelm Weinberg, in Germany, 
demonstrated mathematically that the frequencies of alleles 
(genetic variants) in a population would remain constant over time 
when there are no other intervening factors, such as mutation, 
selection, or immigration. Scientists could now calculate the effects 
of mutation rates or selection pressures to see how genetic variation 
spreads through a population over time, potentially leading to a 
speciation event. This law provided one more major step towards 
the quantification of the biological sciences and a view of species as 
the result of measurable genetic forces. 
Historians of science have characterized the move to 
quantification and calculation as definitive of modern science, with 
biology the last of the natural sciences to become modern in this 
sense (or “Heideggerian” in Gross’s sense), as the 19th century’s 
natural history became the 20th century’s phylogenetics and 
systematics. James Wynn has examined the developing role of 
mathematics in biological argument during the 19th century, 
showing how Darwin’s and Mendel’s ideas about variation, 
evolution, and heredity helped transform biology “from a 
predominantly qualitative science to one with a vital, mathematical 
component” in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (2012, p. xvi). 
As Wynn argues, Darwin’s reading, correspondence, and notebooks 
show him determined to provide quantitative evidence for the 
patterns of change that underlie his theory of evolution, and it was 
only his haste to publish in the wake of Wallace’s publications that 
forced him to leave the mathematical detail out of his “summary,” 
the Origin (2012, pp. 36-64). And noting “the increasing centrality 
of visuals to scientific communication and thought, a centrality 
more and more evident as the nineteenth century unfolded,” Gross 
connects quantification to visualization as together indicative of the 
“wholesale objectification of the world” by science (A. Gross, 2007, 
pp. 52, 53).  
In their study of scientific image-making from the 18th through 
the early 20th centuries, Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison present 
a visual history that informs what we are seeing with tree diagrams 
at this juncture and provide another rationale for what we call the 
“materialist tradition” of visualizing the tree of life. They conclude 
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that scientific epistemology moved from an 18th-century “truth-to-
nature” ideal for visual representation to an ideal of “mechanical 
objectivity,” emerging in the mid-19th century, and finally to 
“trained judgment” in the 20th century. The “truth-to-nature” ideal 
underlies the 18th-century ambitions to reveal the “natural system” 
through abstract representations of its logic derived from the 
selective observations of the expert; these visuals “characteristically 
praised the regularity of God’s laws as . . . worthy of admiration” 
(2010, p. 68). Daston and Galison use Linnaeus as the paradigm 
example of commitment to “truth to nature,” as seen in his 
dichotomous and essentializing diagrams. What Daston and 
Galison refer to as “mechanical objectivity” seeks to “repress the 
willful intervention of the artist-author [i.e., the image maker], and 
to put in its stead a set of procedures that would, as it were, move 
nature to the page through a strict protocol, if not automatically” 
(2010, p. 121), and this ambition underlies the materialist trend in 
tree diagrams. Further, as we have found with the traditions of 
visualizing the tree of life, Daston and Galison note that the three 
epistemic ideals do not replace each other successively but rather 
proliferate and compete: “Each successive stage presupposes and 
builds upon, as well as reacts to, the earlier ones” (2010, p. 18).  
What we call the “materialist” tradition in visualizing evolutionary 
trees, then, is a reflection of Heideggerian or modern science and of 
the ideal of mechanical objectivity.21 The sources of this tradition lie 
not in social practices like genealogy, or in religion or logic, but 
rather in older sciences such as physics and chemistry. The 
developments in biology that enabled thinking about inheritance 
and variation in statistical terms and about genetics as a predictable 
process subject to calculation presented new opportunities for 
understanding the “tree of life” because they ostensibly provided a 
 
21 Two readers of this paper have pointed to similarities between what 
we are calling the “materialist” and “logical” traditions because the 
Porphyrian logic tree is a schema for the material universe. These two 
traditions may represent the same ambition (i.e., to map relations of 
physical reality), but we believe the differences are more significant. First, 
of course, trees in the logical tradition do not include the dimension of 
time, which is an important aspect of the materialist tradition even when 
not directly mapped; for example, insofar as they are “rooted,” the logical 
trees begin with a timeless abstraction, and the materialist trees begin 
with at least an implied common ancestor. Second, trees based in the 
logical tradition are a priori, deductive systems, whereas materialist trees 
are (or at least aim to be) empirical and inductive.  
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basis in quantifiable physical reality for creating phylogenetic and 
taxonomic tree diagrams. Despite the appearance of greater 
objectivity in this tradition, however, this part of the story is 
complex and rife with controversy,22 and we can cover just a few 
highlights below. We will focus on the ways in which tree diagrams 
became “objective” and “materialist,” that is, on their basis in 
various methods of physical measurement and calculation.  
The methodological problems of biological classification provoked 
two conflicting responses that drew on the new quantitative and 
material understandings of biology to produce new types of tree 
diagrams. The first, using observable morphological characteristics, 
is known as phenetics, or numerical taxonomy. This approach 
aimed to quantify degrees of similarity between organisms by using 
multiple morphological features; they thus generally rely on 
measures of correlation. The earliest diagrams of this type, 
identified by Pietsch as the earliest produced by numerical methods 
(2012, p. 256), were published in two papers in 1957 and 1958 by 
Charles Michener and Robert Sokal, who used an “IBM tabulator” 
(Michener & Sokal, 1957, p. 143). They examined 122 characters 
within 97 species of bees in four genera with the specific aim of 
developing a method to “remove some of the subjective bias from 
taxonomy” (1957, p. 162).23 One distinctive feature of the tree 
diagrams in both papers is the quantitative scale on the y-axis, 
which is not time but rather the correlation coefficient of the 
multiple characters examined (in effect, a measure of “affinity”). 
Figure 9 reproduces one of these diagrams, showing the 
correlation-based relationships—or degrees of evolutionary 
divergence—of species in one genus of bees. The y-axis is the 
correlation coefficient multiplied by 1000; the numbers at the tops 
of the branches designate bee species, and the correlation between 
any two species can be read on the y-axis at the level where the 
branches connect; the dashed horizontal lines are somewhat 
 
22 For a detailed history of the “taxonomy wars” of the 1960s and 1970s, 
see Hull (1988), especially Ch. 5.  
23 Such removal was not complete, however, as each character was 
assigned from 2 to 8 possible states, some of which were the presence or 
absence of a feature (color, for example), some being measurable (length 
or width of a part or ratio of two measurements), and some of which were 
impressions (shape, degree of convexity, density) (Michener & Sokal, 
1957, pp. 139-141, Table 132). 
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“arbitrary” indications of how one might use these data to 
distinguish genera (1957, p. 157).  
Michener and Sokal observe that their diagrams correspond well 
with previously accepted taxonomy but caution that they “represent 
relationships in a static, non-historical sense” (1957, pp. 148, 149), 
so this is a family tree of living relatives, not of ancestors. The 
authors struggle with the dilemma, carried over from the 19th 
century, that a taxonomy or a tree diagram “cannot always show 
both common descent and evolutionary divergence” (1957, p. 156), 
Figure 9. Diagram of relationships for the genus Anthocopa obtained by 
the weighted variable group method. Republished with permission of 
John Wiley & Sons, from “A quantitative approach to a problem in 
classification,” by Charles D. Michener and Robert R. Sokal, in 
Evolution 11, 1957, Fig. 7, p. 148; permission conveyed through 
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the former representing the Darwinian genealogical tradition in 
tree diagrams (a narrative diagram) and the latter a holdover of the 
logical, Linnaean tradition (a conceptual diagram). In fact, the two 
authors disagree on which is preferable. Michener prefers a “more 
or less subjective approach,” using information gained by 
quantitative analysis but modifying it with knowledge of 
phylogenies and adapted for the “convenience” of a classification 
system. Sokal advocates “uniform and objective standards” based 
on quantified relationships for establishing categories (1957, pp. 
156-157). Another issue that troubled Michener and Sokal was how 
to weight the various characteristics within a correlation. Although 
some characteristics carry more information about evolutionary 
history, others are more useful in representing evolutionary 
divergence, that is, they represent intuitive gaps between 
categories. Phenetics usually weighted each characteristic equally, a 
solution that satisfied no one. In Mayr’s judgment, phenetics 
ultimately failed because it basically ignored phylogenetic 
information (1982, pp. 223-225).24   
Phenetics lost favor to the second new approach to objective 
biological classification, which became known as cladistics. 
Working at about the same time as Michener and Sokal, Willi 
Hennig, a German entomologist, proposed that classifications 
should be based exclusively on genealogy. Calling his approach 
phylogenetic systematics, Hennig conceived of phylogeny as a 
series of dichotomies by which ancestral groups produce two 
daughter groups (Mayr, 1982, p. 226). Classification, he held, 
should be based on such monophyletic groups, or “clades.” The 
degree of relationship between groups is determined by recency of 
common ancestry, not by similarity or correlation of characteristics. 
Cladistic analysis relies on determining which characteristics 
shared between groups are ancestral (“primitive” characteristics, 
also called plesiomorphies) and which developed more recently 
(“derived” characteristics, also called apomorphies). Shared derived 
characteristics, or “synapomorphies,” are evidence of recency of 
relatedness (Cracraft & Donoghue, 2004). The resulting diagrams 
are called “cladograms.” Figure 10 shows an early version of 
Hennig’s diagram explaining how monophyletic groups are 
analyzed according to shared derived characteristics. In this figure, 
each monophyletic group (labeled A, B, C, and D) is determined by 
an apomorphous, or derived, characteristic, marked by a black  
 
24 Hull tells a more complex failure story about the personalities and 
social dynamics involved (Hull, 1988).  
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Figure 10. Willi Hennig, "Scheme of Argumentation of 
Phylogenetic Systematics." The open rectangles are 
primitive characteristics and the black rectangles are 
derived characteristics. The letters designate 
monophyletic groups, which are distinguished by shared 
derived characteristics; the numbers by the boxes 
designate traits and the lines show when each trait arose 
relative to others. From Phylogenetic Systematics, p. 91, 
Fig. 22, copyright 1979, Board of Trustees of the 
University of Illinois. Used with permission of the 
University of Illinois Press.  
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square. The black rectangles show apomorphous characteristics 
that are also synapomorphous, meaning they are shared across 
related species. For instance, species D uniquely has apomorphous 
trait 6; species C uniquely has apomorphous trait 5, but both C and 
D have apomorphous and synapomorphous trait 4. Therefore traits 
4, 5, and 6 indicate speciation events from the most recent common 
ancestor of C and D. The open squares and rectangles in this 
diagram show “primitive” characteristics that are shared with the 
most recent common ancestor of A, B, C, and D. 
 One major conceptual difference between cladograms and their 
predecessors is the use of the “branches” themselves as 
informationally significant. Thus, the black bars and white squares 
signify derived and primitive characteristics, respectively. While 
time is still implied in the vertical axis, albeit not always labeled, 
cladograms don’t typically label known or hypothetical ancestors. 
Rather, these diagrams are generally labeled only across the top 
with known species or other monophyletic groups. Therefore, the 
emphasis is placed on the diversity of species and their relatedness 
to each other, whether they are close or distant. In addition, the 
emphasis on representing monophyletic groups produces relatively 
simple trees, with each node, as a point of evolutionary divergence, 
producing no more than two branches, a return to the form of 
dichotomous dialectic that prevailed in medieval logic trees. 
Furthermore, as Kevin Omland and colleagues point out, in 
cladograms the x-axis “has no meaning,” though there has been an 
unfortunate tendency to put more “primitive” species at the left and 
“higher” species at the right (2008, pp. 856, 862) and thus to read 
cladograms as progressive, a continuing holdover from the scala 
naturae (though with the axes reversed).25  
Early on, cladists relied on observable morphology to generate 
their trees, but later in the 20th century, various molecular methods 
were developed, including protein sequencing, DNA–DNA 
hybridization, and RNA sequencing (Pietsch, 2012, p. 274; Velasco, 
2013, p. 341), all of which provided a literally material basis, on the 
 
25 Omland et al. emphasize that since cladograms represent only extant 
species, none can be ancestral to the others and since all have continued 
to evolve, none should be thought of as more primitive than others: 
“Improved tree thinking will not only help us better understand the 
evolution of the particular characters that we are studying, but will also 
improve our fundamental understanding of the process of evolution” 
(2008, p. 856). 
 
Miller 
Hartzog 42  Poroi 15,2 (May 2020) 
 
level of molecules, for calculating genetic difference and 
constructing tree diagrams. An example from what Pietsch calls a 
“landmark paper” (2012, p. 275), shown in Figure 11, presents a 
classification of birds based on DNA samples from 1058 species 
(Sibley et al., 1988, p. 410). This work followed Hennig’s precept 
that taxonomic categories should be based on the age of origin of 
each group. DNA–DNA hybridization is a way to determine the 
degree of difference (and thus the time since divergence, given 
assumptions about the rate of evolutionary change) by measuring 
the strength of chemical bonds between DNA strands from two 
organisms; we might consider this a molecular measure of 
“affinity.” Here the difference is shown by the delta T50H number at 
each node; the number in parentheses is the number of DNA 
hybrids tested at that node (Sibley et al., 1988, p. 410). This method 
of quantifying evolutionary relationships was somewhat 
controversial, and work by others using newer methods provided 
only “mixed” confirmation of these results (Archibald, 2014, pp. 
176, 178).  
Molecular approaches led to significant advances in evolutionary 
biology, demonstrating the value of the materialist approach to 
biological science. In 1987, Carl Richard Woese published a 
revolutionary version of the tree of life based on ribosomal RNA 
sequence data. Rather than dividing all living organisms into two 
kingdoms, the Eukaryotes and the Prokaryotes, this new tree, based 
on research published as early as 1977, proposed three kingdoms: 
the Eubacteria, the Eukaryotes (including plants, fungi, and 
animals), and the Archaebacteria, or Archaea, previously 
unrecognized as a distinct kingdom. Since ribosomal RNA 
functions as an “evolutionary clock” (Woese, 1987, pp. 226-227), 
the RNA data enabled calculation of evolutionary distances, which 
are represented on the tree by proportional line lengths and order 
of branching.26 And since time is shown only by the length of the 
lines and not by their orientation, this tree does not really have x- 
or y-axes and must be read differently from those that do. The 
original version of the figure showed no “root” because no universal 
common ancestor had been identified, but a later version does show 
the position of the root, based on a few genes that emerged before 
the three primary lineages appeared (Woese et al., 1990, p. 4578, 
Fig. 1). Figure 12 is a public-domain version of the 1990 rooted 
diagram, which has been described as “the last of the great classical  
 
26 Although no numbers are shown directly on the diagram, extensive 
quantitative data are provided in the lengthy 1987 paper. 
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Figure 11. Major divisions of the class Aves. The numbers at 
the nodes represent a measure of genomic divergence based 
on DNA–DNA hybridization. Republished with permission of 
Oxford University Press, from “A  Classification of the Living 
Birds of the World based on DNA–DNA Hybridization 
Studies,” by Charles  G. Sibley, Jon E. Ahlquist, and Burt L. 
Monroe, in The Auk, 105 (3), 1988, Fig 1, p. 410; permission 
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trees, authoritative, profound, completely new to science” in the 
recent general-interest book on this topic by David Quammen 
(2018).  
Conceptually, Woese’s work opened an entire new domain of 
evolutionary biology. Since then, similar “universal” trees of life 
have shown that the majority of the earth’s diversity exists within 
the microbial kingdoms. Structurally, many of these diagrams are 
distinct in using a radial pattern instead of a vertical one, retaining 
the structure of a tree only in the logical sense of successive 
branching, but losing any visual resemblance to an actual tree. The 
radial pattern, used partly to save space, accomplishes a few things: 
it de-emphasizes the animal kingdom, which, as it turns out, makes 
up only a minute number of the total number of organisms on our 
planet, and it helps to minimize the erroneous implication of 
evolution as progress towards perfection, as there is no visually 
dominant end-point. However, like the more traditional upward- or 
sideways-branching tree structures, radial cladograms continue to 
carry the implication that diversity increases with time because they 
do not include extinct taxa; thus, if there is a narrative vector, it is 
one not of progress but of sheer proliferation. Figure 13 is an 
Figure 12. Universal phylogenetic tree in rooted form, originally from 
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example of a circular diagram, generated from completely 
sequenced genomes, where time is on the radial axis.27   
 
 
 With the development of powerful computational algorithms, and 
fast, inexpensive DNA and RNA sequencing tools, cladistics became 
the most powerful form of phylogenetic analysis in the late 20th and 
early 21st centuries. The study of avian evolution discussed in our 
introduction used these powerful new methods. Jarvis et al. (2014) 
generated their tree using massive whole-genome analyses of a 
wide range of known avian species. That tree is a sideways 
cladogram fully within the materialist tradition of tree visualization, 
with an x-axis of time, a y-axis showing diversity, and bifurcations 
marked with numbers indicating a statistical measure of confidence 
based on resampling and replications. In another recent study, Hug 
et al. (2016) use similar whole genome methods based on 
ribosomal protein sequences to generate a new tree of life from 
 
27 A much more detailed version from the same dataset is available at 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tree_of_life_SVG.svg.  
Figure 13. A circular “tree” of life, generated from the Interactive 
Tree of Life (ITOL), an online phylogenetic tree viewer. Eukaryotes 
are colored red, archaea green, and bacteria blue. By Tim Vickers, 
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genomes in public databases and from over 1000 little studied 
organisms recovered from a variety of environments. The resulting 
tree shows an even greater diversity in the living world than was 
previously thought. Interestingly, the results are presented in two 
ways, both as an unrooted radial tree and as a sideways cladogram; 
both show a numerical scale for branch length based on the mean 
number of protein substitutions per site, which provide a physical 
basis for the visualizations. Both versions make it visually obvious 
that the diversity of the Prokaryotes far exceeds that of the 
Eukaryotes and in fact make the familiar plants and animals look 
like a minor evolutionary result. This project was ranked as one of 
Altmetric’s top 100 papers of 2016.28 
The recent discoveries about the immense diversity of 
Prokaryotes and Archaea were accompanied by an increased 
understanding that microbial life in these kingdoms involves 
biological processes that differ significantly from those of the 
Eukaryotes, the plants and animals that dominated the tree 
diagrams of the nineteenth century and earlier, and these processes 
call into question the value of the tree diagram itself. Most 
significant perhaps is the process of lateral (or horizontal) gene 
transfer, that is, the movement of genetic material from one 
organism to another by means other than sexual or asexual 
reproduction.29 Such movement of genetic material disrupts the 
pattern of vertical descent in successive generations and 
complicates the determination of phylogenetic relationships 
(Olendzenski & Gogarten, 2009). Other complicating processes 
include hybridization and endosymbiosis, or the fact that 
Eukaryotes at some early stage seem to have incorporated other 
organisms into their cellular machinery, such as mitochondria and 
chloroplasts (Velasco, 2013, p. 343). As J. David Archibald 
comments, “molecular methods . . . began to cast considerable 
doubt on the very idea that life’s phylogeny might resemble a stately 
tree. Rather, life’s history seemed more to suggest a tangled web” 
(2014, p. 178), and many have begun to question the ongoing utility 
and accuracy of the tree diagram in evolutionary biology. W. Ford 
Doolittle, for example, argues that the tree of life “should never 




29 For example, genetic material can be transferred between bacteria by 
virus-like particles called “gene-transfer agents.” See Quammen (2018).  
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microbiology” (2009, p. 2227); for Darwin, he claims, the tree of 
life “was a hypothesis, which lateral gene transfer in prokaryotes 
now shows to be false” (2009, p. 2221). Some have begun to doubt 
that the differences between phenetic (morphological) and cladistic 
(genealogical) approaches to classification can ever be resolved: 
“The enduring beauty of Darwin’s TOL [tree of life] hypothesis is 
that it promises to align the outcome of these two classificatory 
practices,” but lateral gene transfer “disrupts” this “workable 
alignment of phenetics and cladistic practices” (Doolittle, 2009, p. 
2226; see also Velasco, 2013).  
Doolittle proposes “pattern pluralism” to relieve the tree of life “of 
its responsibilities as the sole proper representation of the history 
of living things,” suggesting that scientists need to be alert to 
multiple mechanisms and patterns of relationship that may be 
obscured by over-reliance on tree-thinking (2009, p. 2227). Velasco 
mentions a number of other patterns that have been suggested “to 
play the ‘represent everything’ role”: the forest of life, the web or 
network of life, the coral of life, among others, suggesting that if any 
of these is correct, then Darwin’s tree hypothesis must be wrong 
(2013; see also Arnold & Fogarty, 2009; Ragan, 2009; 2013, p. 
345).30 If the “tree of life” hasn’t yet come to the end of the line 
scientifically, many believe it must be used in much more careful 
and constricted ways than it has been and that it should no longer 
claim the immense power over the biological imagination that it has 
held for so long. In rhetorical terms, it should no longer serve as a 
default warrant for enthymemes.  
Nevertheless, there have been attempts to “save the tree,” in part 
by rethinking the diagram to include rhizomatic tangles or 
networked branching, such as in Doolittle’s widely reproduced and 
elaborated “reticulated tree” (1999, pp. 2127, Fig. 2123), which has 
become the source of the developing field of reticulate evolution 
 
30 In this regard, biologists are replicating the philosophical move made 
by Deleuze and Guattari in their advocacy of the rhizome as a better 
metaphor than the tree for Western thought: “We're tired of trees. We 
should stop believing in trees, roots, and radicles. They've made us suffer 
too much. All of arborescent culture is founded on them, from biology to 
linguistics” (1987, p. 15). They characterize arborescent systems as 
“hierarchical . . . with centers of significance and subjectification” (1987, 
p. 16) and the rhizome as “an antigenealogy” (1987, p. 21). However, we 
doubt that biology can do without either hierarchy, which is central to 
classification, or genealogy, central to evolution.  
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(see Gontier, 2015) and a new type of diagram known as 
“reticulograms” (see Figure 14).  
 The conventional tree image itself still dominates many ongoing 
projects, such as the online Tree of Life, a crowd-sourced effort 
whose “goal is to contain a page with pictures, text, and other 
information for every species and for each group of organisms, 
living or extinct,” displayed in a way that “visitors can browse the 
hierarchy of life and learn about phylogeny and evolution as well as 
the characteristics of individual groups.31 Each page, at every level 
of classification, includes a cladogram showing the clades or classes 
 
31 http://tolweb.org/tree/ 
Figure 14. Doolittle’s “reticulated tree,” representing lateral gene transfer. 
Republished with permission of American Association for the 
Advancement of Science, from “Phylogenetic Classification and the 
Universal Tree,” by W. Ford Doolittle, in Science 284 (5423), 1999, Fig. 3, 
p. 2127, https://science-sciencemag-
org.prox.lib.ncsu.edu/content/284/5423/2124; permission conveyed 
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included there with links to higher-level clades as well as to the 
specific classes covered. Other examples include the Interactive 
Tree of Life (ITOL), a more technical online tool, which allows 
scientists to contribute datasets and annotate, edit, and export 
high-resolution tree diagrams,32 and T-Rex, a web tool that maps 
lateral gene transfer and produces both traditional tree diagrams 
and reticulograms.33  
To summarize, what we find in tree diagrams based in a 
materialist tradition of visualization are several features of note. 
First, as noted earlier, most such diagrams have axes that can be 
labeled precisely with some unit of measure that provides a physical 
or statistical basis for the shape of the diagram and often serves as a 
proxy for time. Second, these diagrams retain the ambivalence we 
noted at the beginning: they show both states and processes (in 
Kress and van Leeuwen’s terms, they are both conceptual and 
narrative), though in varying degrees. For example, in Figures 8 
and 9, it is both the overall pattern of relations that is of interest but 
also the specific order and sequence of branching, particularly in 
Figure 9, where there is a quantitative basis for it. Third, 
orientation comes to be less significant, when the narrative vector is 
reduced, so we have sideways cladograms and radial trees, as well 
as upright rooted trees. Fourth, one axis often remains similar to 
earlier types of diagrams, representing variety or numerousness, 
but here the representation is less speculative and more precise, as 
with the species of bees on the x-axis in Figure 9 or the orders of 
birds on the y-axis in the cladogram of Figure 11. The other axis 
represents a measure of evolutionary divergence, or genetic 
diversity, or a proxy measurement for time, determined by the 
increasingly sophisticated molecular methods available. The 
exceptions in the examples we have used are the last three, Figures 
12, 13, and 14, which are more abstract than empirical, but even 
these have been made possible by the quantitative methods of many 
prior studies, which they summarize. And finally, it is the material 
methods of genomics and molecular biology that have made it 
possible to challenge the hegemony of the tree of life as a 




33 http://www.trex.uqam.ca/; see also (Boc et al., 2012).  
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Conclusion 
We have called these visual representations of the tree of life 
“diagrams,” and it’s worth asking what the rhetorical qualities of a 
diagram are, in contrast to other types of visualizations. It seems 
generally agreed that a diagram is a visual representation that aims 
less at pictorial realism than at underlying structures or 
relationships; that they represent abstractions or concepts rather 
than objects; that what they represent is not otherwise available to 
ordinary vision (Bender & Marrinan, 2010, p. 33; Freedberg, 2003, 
p. 397; Gross & Harmon, 2014, ch. 2); in one formulation, “a 
diagram is a picture, in which one is intended to perform inference 
about the thing pictured, by mentally following around the parts of 
the diagram” (Franklin, 2000, p. 55). In some respects, to call the 
earliest visualizations of the tree of life “diagrams” is anachronistic, 
for the early cosmological and genealogical images do aim at 
picturing the order of creation or the genealogy of Jesus, for 
example, making it seem available to ordinary vision by being 
realistic, engaging, and memorable. Haeckel’s “great oak” is 
perhaps the most recent such image, and its audience is a broad one 
similar to the audiences for medieval religious iconography such as 
stained-glass windows. Later tree visualizations with more 
specialized scientific audiences are less decorative and more 
abstract, closer to what we now think of as a scientific diagram. And 
yet, as we have tried to demonstrate here, what we might think of as 
the diagrammatic qualities of these images do not depend on the 
presence or absence of pictorial detail but rather on the use of 
horizontal and vertical space to represent relationships of space or 
time, similarity or difference, inclusion or descent; the use of 
branches and nodes to represent entities and their relationships; 
the invocation of either stasis or directionality. The tree-form 
persists over time, even as the interpretive frameworks that we have 
called visual traditions change and with them the questions that 
these diagrams address, the inferences they invite, and the 
meanings they convey.  
Fahnestock has called for “more specifically rhetorical histories of 
scientific discourse” that trace “the rise, change, and occasional fall 
of argumentative practices, devices, methods, techniques, or of the 
commonplaces” (2013, p. 13). Our visual rhetorical history of the 
tree of life demonstrates how one type of visual image can help 
explain how current practices in scientific visualization have 
developed and where some of the continuing disagreements in 
evolutionary biology come from. The relative stability of the tree 
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form in the changing contexts in which it has been used suggest 
that it functions as a “boundary object,” as characterized by Susan 
Star and James Greisemer: “Boundary objects are objects which are 
both plastic enough to adapt to local needs and constraints of the 
several parties employing them, yet robust enough to maintain a 
common identity across sites. . . . They have different meanings in 
different social worlds but their structure is common enough to 
more than one world to make them recognizable, a means of 
translation” (1989, p. 393). The robust qualities of boundary 
objects, then, can facilitate comprehension across boundaries even 
as their plastic qualities, while meeting the rhetorical needs of 
specialized rhetors, can obscure failures of cross-boundary 
comprehension. In our case, the relatively robust tree form has 
different meanings across the various traditions of visualization we 
have discussed. The meanings rely on different evidence to support 
them, from religious scripture, to logical dichotomies, to fossils, to 
mitochondrial DNA, and so on; in addition, the meanings are 
grounded in different interpretive traditions, from cosmology to 
logic to genealogy and scientific materialism.  
If, as we have been suggesting, visual traditions serve as rhetorical 
contexts that provide backing, or “objects of agreement,” for 
enthymematic interpretation of tree diagrams, this may explain 
how boundary objects work rhetorically. They become polysemic 
warrants for arguments in different fields. We may think they mean 
the same thing in these different fields, but their polysemic 
plasticity is deceptive, and the “sameness” is illusory. So the tree of 
life may have the same general form in Darwin as it does in Haeckel 
or in a medieval treatise on logic or a modern biology textbook, but 
each makes a quite different argument in its own context: it 
“means” differently. The boundary object provides an 
enthymematic warrant for different kinds of inquiries and different 
kinds of arguments derived from different traditions of 
visualization. And the case of the tree of life illustrates the value of 
rhetoric in understanding scientific visualization; we offer the case 
in response to Gross’s claims about the poverty of rhetoric in this 
regard.  
Over a century and a half after the publication of Darwin’s Origin, 
scientists are still working to construct a universal tree of life. The 
sheer size and complexity of mapping all the world’s species and 
their relationships have made the integration of data into one 
coherent and agreed-upon tree difficult, to say the least. To combat 
some of these complex issues, scientists have explicitly called for 
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“powerful visualization tools—tools that will enable visualization of 
‘dark areas’ (poorly known or missing groups), identification of 
strongly supported vs. weakly supported areas of the tree, 
integration with all associated metadata . . ., and navigation tools to 
traverse branches of the tree and processes occurring within the 
lineages” (Collins, Kearney, & Maddison, 2013, § “NSF’s 
Assembling”). As a central visualization tool in evolutionary 
biology, the tree of life remains important, functioning as a tool for 
invention—literally showing “places” where our knowledge is 
missing or unsettled, providing evidence for new claims, and 
relying on backing and assumptions that draw from multiple 
traditions of tree visualization. Tree diagrams provide not just ways 
of seeing but ways of thinking and arguing, and these remain 
required skills for evolutionary biologists, even as the meaning and 
adequacy of the “tree of life” remains in contention.  
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